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This article discusses the central government policy 
for drinking water supply in rural areas. It examines its 
evolution from the 1970s onwards and focuses, in 
particular, on the reforms of the past decade, looking 
more specifically at the Swajaldhara Guidelines. These 
reforms are of capital importance because they seek to 
completely change the rural drinking water supply 
policy framework. 
The primacy of drinking water supply in water law is undis-puted. This is refl ected in the recognition of the funda-mental right to water whose existence has been repeatedly 
confi rmed by the Supreme Court.1 This is also refl ected in the 
importance that the central and state governments give to the 
fulfi lment of drinking water needs. Thus, all water policies that 
prioritise water uses put in principle drinking water as their 
top priority. 
This unchallenged importance of drinking water is surpris-
ingly not carried in legislative enactments. Indeed, in a context 
where water law has developed in a sectoral manner and includes 
in each state a number of laws covering a variety of water uses such 
as irrigation and different water bodies such as groundwater, the 
absence of a drinking water legislation is very noticeable. This 
cannot be dismissed as a relic of the past since a host of recent 
legislations adopted as part of ongoing water law reforms fail to 
give drinking water the place it deserves.
The absence of drinking water legislation does not imply that 
the government undertakes activities in this sector without a 
policy framework. In fact, the recognition of the importance of 
fulfi lling the water needs of the whole population and the 
p erceived slackness of state governments in this area has led 
the union government to intervene through policy instruments 
and by way of funding water infrastructure, in particular in 
r ural areas. 
This article focuses on the evolving policy framework for 
drinking water supply in rural areas at the union level. It exam-
ines its evolution from the 1970s onwards and focuses in particu-
lar on the reforms of the past decade, looking more specifi cally at 
the Swajaldhara Guidelines. These reforms are of capital impor-
tance because they seek to completely change the rural drinking 
water supply policy framework. 
1 Policy Framework 
The law and policy framework for rural water supply includes 
different elements. The recognition of the existence of a funda-
mental right to water in the Constitution implies that all drinking 
water laws and policy frameworks directly fall under this general 
mandate. The same is true with regard to the decentralisation 
framework adopted in the context of constitutional amendments. 
Existing water laws also bear on drinking water supply in direct 
and indirect ways. This is, for instance, the case of groundwater 
legislation that specifi cally exempts from the permit system put 
in place hand-operated devices. Overall, while there are a number 
of constitutional or legislative principles and norms that apply, 
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the documents that really matter in practice are the non-binding 
policy frameworks adopted by the government.
1.1 Pre-Reform Policy Framework
The provision of drinking water is primarily the responsibility of 
states. Yet, the union government has played an important role in 
fashioning the policies that states apply and provided signifi cant 
funding to ensure access to water in rural areas. The Rajiv Gan-
dhi National Drinking Water Mission (RGNDWM) has been the key 
institution with regard to the development of policies and the ad-
ministration of the rural drinking water sector. Among the 
schemes it implements, the Accelerated Rural Water Supply Pro-
gramme (ARWSP), which is funded by the government of India 
and state governments, plays a central role. The ARWSP was fi rst 
introduced in 1972, and has been a central component of the gov-
ernment’s attempts to ensure full coverage of all habitations 
throughout the country. It continues to provide the basis for the 
union government’s interventions in rural drinking water.
The ARWSP Guidelines provide the core framework used by the 
RGNDWM in ensuring the provision of drinking water to all habi-
tations in the country.2 The guidelines provide several key policy 
elements. First, they defi ne the different levels of coverage. Non-
covered habitations are defi ned as having access to less than 10 
litres per capita per day (lpcd). Partially covered habitations are 
those having access to 10 to 40 lpcd. Covered habitations are de-
fi ned as having access to 40 lpcd. Quantity is not the only crite-
rion to determine whether a habitation is covered. The source of 
water also needs to be within 1.6 km or 100 metre elevation in 
mountain areas. The water should also not be affected by quality 
problems even though no specifi c standards for determining 
quality are included and must thus be indirectly inferred from 
existing standards. Another criterion is that a given public source 
of water such as a handpump should not be used to serve more 
than 250 people.3 
The minimum level of 40 lpcd is acknowledged by the RGNDWM 
as a basic level of coverage which should be increased over time. 
Thus, in states where all habitations have been covered at the 
level of 40 lpcd, the government of India has approved that 
the next level of service should be 55 lpcd within 500 metres of 
the house or 50 metre elevation in mountain areas.4 Further, 
some states have long-term objectives which go beyond these 
minimum. Thus, Gujarat’s Vision 2010 envisages, for instance, 
the supply of 80 lpcd in rural areas, while the draft water policy 
in Rajasthan suggests 60 lpcd for rural areas in general and 
70 lpcd for desert areas.5
Over time, the efforts of the union and state governments have 
made a major difference to crores of people throughout the coun-
try. While the government’s intervention has not ensured that 
every individual in the country has access to the minimum de-
fi ned in the ARWSP, it is not disputed that signifi cant successes 
have been achieved since the 1970s. The government’s interven-
tion was not undertaken on the basis of any act passed by Parlia-
ment and the ARWSP Guidelines do not refer to fundamental 
rights. Yet, the government showed through the policy frame-
work it adopted and its actions in practice a clear intent to fulfi l 
the fundamental right to water.
1.2 Framework for Reforms
The conceptual framework for drinking water policy has com-
prehensively changed over the past decade. A number of initia-
tives have been taken in different contexts from the union level 
to international funding agencies’ projects and state level meas-
ures. While each can be analysed separately, the pattern which 
emerges is overwhelmingly consistent. In other words, while 
there are different problems in different parts of the country 
and different a ctors have been involved in policy changes, the 
response given by policymakers at all levels is substantially the 
same. This implies that at the level of formal policymaking, 
there is a general consensus on the basic problems affecting 
drinking water in rural areas and the basic solutions that need 
to be adopted.
Changes in drinking water rural policies have been brought in 
a number of ways. These include changes in the existing policies 
of the government of India, adoption of new policies at the union 
and state levels as well as development projects such as the World 
Bank projects. At the union level, one of the fi rst important 
n oticeable signs of the new conceptual framework is found in the 
1999-2000 version of the ARWSP Guidelines. They specifi cally 
highlight that one of the reasons for the existence of still uncov-
ered villages includes the non-involvement of people in operation 
and maintenance.6 The revision of the guidelines was specifi cally 
undertaken with a view to achieve full coverage of all rural habi-
tations during the Ninth Plan (1997-02). Three of the guiding 
principles stand out: These are the call for an increase in people’s 
participation, the need to treat water as a socio-economic good 
and the use of 20% of available funds for states promoting re-
forms along these lines. The revised guidelines make it clear that 
it is necessary to move away from the perception of water as a 
“social right” and rather manage water as “socio-economic good” 
to ensure its “effective use”.7
The guidelines put a signifi cant emphasis on the need for 
p eople participation as a way to move away from supply-led to 
demand-led schemes. They identify a number of key conditions 
for the introduction of demand-led projects. These include the 
ownership of assets and involvement in the setting up of the in-
frastructure. More signifi cantly, the guidelines recognise that 
demand-led schemes require an imposition on people to pay for 
operation and maintenance and the knowledge that the govern-
ment will not maintain the assets.8 The message has recently 
been reinforced with the Eleventh Plan specifi cally calling for 
state support to panchayats for operation and maintenance as a 
“hand-holding support for fi rst few years before the local bodies 
become self-sustainable”9.
Sector reforms put in place require all state and district 
a uthorities to impose at least 10% capital cost payment by villag-
ers.10 Additionally, the ARWSP Guidelines clearly lay down that 
the contribution of people must increase with the level of service 
provided. Thus, where villages want to increase their supply from 
40 lpcd to 55 lpcd, they have to pay at least 20% of the capital cost 
on top of all operation and maintenance expenses.11 The form of 
the contribution has been an ongoing debate. While in certain 
cases, a choice of cash, labour or materials is provided, some 
d ocuments suggest a full cash contribution.12
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Rural drinking water policy reforms have taken place at differ-
ent levels. Initiatives taken at the union or state level constitute 
two important elements of the overall reform process. Their ef-
fort must nevertheless be understood in the broader context of a 
string of water-related development projects funded, in particu-
lar, by the World Bank. Indeed, not only have World Bank projects 
been instrumental in pushing forward the new policy agenda, 
but the World Bank has also been closely associated with the 
p olicy changes taken at the state and union levels. It advocated, 
for instance, already a decade ago that “[s]ubsidised water and 
highly centralised water management in the rural sector have 
r esulted in poor water service at high cost” and that this under-
mined efforts to promote a more effi cient and sustainable use of 
water.13 It further advised the government that cost recovery was 
the only option to ensure that universal access to drinking water 
would not remain an “unattainable dream”.14 It also specifi cally 
called for the immediate imposition of operation and mainte-
nance to users and the progressive implementation of capital cost 
recovery with the introduction of a 10% contribution during what 
it saw as a transition period towards full cost recovery.
Interventions by external agencies have evolved over the past 
decade. The project that broke away from the previous model of 
supply-driven, top-down drinking water delivery was the Swajal 
project that introduced the new framework represented in 
the ArWSP Guidelines of demand-driven schemes, community 
participation, and communities bearing part of the capital costs 
and full operation and maintenance costs. Swajal was a pilot 
project carried out in two regions of the then undivided Uttar 
Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Bundelkhand, both facing severe – but 
different – water supply problems. Its implementation between 
1996 and 2002 was instrumental in shaping the policy reforms 
that are currently under way. By 1999, the union government 
decided to broaden the Swajal experiment throughout the country. 
It started the Sector Reform Project (SRP) which sought to imple-
ment in 67 districts of the whole country the key principles of the 
Swajal project.15 This was then extended to the whole country in 
the guise of the Swajaldhara Guidelines immediately after the 
completion of the Swajal project. The World Bank was also gener-
ally satisfi ed with Swajal and this success has led the Bank to 
implement several other projects based on the Swajal project 
philo sophy in the past few years.
2 The Swajaldhara Guidelines
The Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) spearheaded the 
adoption of the guidelines on Swajaldhara. The guidelines fi rst 
set out to demonstrate that while water has been perceived as a 
social right, this is inappropriate as water should, in fact, be seen 
as a socio-economic good. Additionally, they aver that the deliv-
ery of the social right has been through the government which 
has not suffi ciently taken into account the preferences of users 
and has been ineffective in ensuring the carrying out of opera-
tion and maintenance activities. This calls for a demand-led ap-
proach seeing water as an economic good. The second paragraph 
of the background is even more revealing. It specifi cally links the 
transformation of a supply-driven system to a demand-driven 
system taking into account the preferences of users, “where users 
get the service they want and are willing to pay for”.16 This is 
taken one step further by indicating that it is the imposition of 
full cost recovery of operations and maintenance and replace-
ment costs on the communities which are expected to generate a 
sense of ownership and ensure the fi nancial viability and sustain-
ability of the schemes.
The Swajaldhara principles display a striking similarity with 
the framework introduced under the Swajal project. First, Swa-
jaldhara provides for the adoption of a demand-led approach that 
includes participation of the community from the choice of the 
drinking water scheme up to its implementation. Second, the 
guidelines seek a form of decentralisation and request that drink-
ing water assets should be owned by the relevant panchayat and 
that the communities should have the power to plan, implement 
and operate all drinking water schemes. Third, the participation 
and decentralisation elements are brought together in the con-
text of the fi nancial principles which are a compromised version 
of full-cost recovery. Thus, while users have to bear the entire re-
sponsibility for the operation and maintenance of drinking water 
schemes, their contribution to capital costs is limited. In practice, 
this was fi rst set at 10% for a service level of 40 lpcd but, in a 
number of situations, this percentage has already been exceeded. 
Under Swajaldhara, at least half of the 10% contribution must be 
in cash. Exceptions have, for instance, been provided for sched-
uled tribes areas, where the cash contribution was fi rst reduced 
to one quarter of the community contribution.17 Subsequently, in 
2006 an amendment to the guidelines provided that the contri-
bution in the case of villages where scheduled tribe/scheduled 
caste (ST/SC) constituted more than half of all habitations could 
be in any form without any stipulation of a contribution in cash.18 
Fourth, from an institutional perspective, one of the conse-
quences of a demand-led perspective is the rethinking of the role 
of the government. The guidelines here specifi cally provide that 
the aim is to shift the government’s role from “direct service 
d elivery” to only supporting a limited number of activities such 
as planning, policy formulation, monitoring and evaluation.
An important aspect of the Swajaldhara scheme is that it was 
undertaken at the union level without specifi c parliamentary 
mandate. Since water is largely a state prerogative, the states 
may not have bought into the new conceptual framework. The 
union thus decided to proceed in two steps. First, it decided to 
provide full funding for the scheme, a departure from the usual 
ARWSP norm where the union and the states each share half of 
the costs. During the Tenth Plan, 20% of funds allocated to the 
ARWSP were directed to reform projects under the Swajaldhara 
Guidelines.19 Second, it proposed that the states interested in tak-
ing up Swajaldhara funding should sign up a memorandum of 
understanding with the union. The intent of the model memo-
randum of understanding circulated to states was to ensure that 
the reform principles would be, as far as possible, main-
streamed.20 Apart from this general commitment to reforms of 
the drinking water sector, the states were, for instance, also 
called upon to handover all existing drinking water schemes to 
gram panchayats for operation and maintenance.
The process of decentralisation and participation takes differ-
ent forms under ongoing reforms. On the one hand, some of the 
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proposed measures go towards ensuring that operation and 
maintenance of schemes is more successful. Thus, panchayats 
are, for instance, allowed to contract any required person where 
the government does not make its people available.21 In principle, 
this should provide ways to ensure that any bottlenecks in the 
government do not affect actual operation and maintenance. Vil-
lagers complain, however, that only government offi cials have 
access to original spare parts and that private traders always pro-
vide substandard quality. On the other hand, the same set of re-
forms proposes measures which are likely to lead to even more 
widespread inequalities in access to water within panchayats, 
and particularly within different districts and states. Thus, the 
proposal seeking to allow panchayats to fi x and collect water tar-
iff is fraught with diffi culties.22 If tariffs are fi xed at the level of 
each and every panchayat, the most likely consequence is that 
villages that suffer the most from water scarcity, for instance, be-
cause the water table is very low or water quality is low will have 
to bear all the costs themselves and will thus pay much more than 
villages that happen to be endowed with more or better water. 
Similarly, where costs are fi xed within each panchayat without 
government overseeing, the likelihood is that dalits and other 
similar communities will be further marginalised because their 
say in the decision-making process will not only be low as it has 
been traditionally, but more so because the reforms propose a 
decision-making process based on the notion of users which ex-
cludes most poor people. Experience with the Swajal project 
shows that where communities are left to collect tariffs them-
selves, public taps are rapidly switched off. Whether the real rea-
son is the one given by users that money is not being paid or 
whether it is a decision of a more political nature, the result is the 
same for people who are denied access to water. Given the nature 
of water, and drinking water in particular, any policy which does 
not attempt to redistribute the costs of getting access to water 
across social classes and across geographical areas is bound to 
fail from an equity perspective. 
2.1 Swajaldhara in Practice
The analysis of the Swajaldhara Guidelines gives an interesting 
overview of important issues raised by the introduction of the 
reforms in the drinking water sector. Yet, an analysis of Swajald-
hara on the ground is required because the successes and failures 
encountered in specifi c villages have important lessons for the 
development of legal and policy frameworks in years to come. 
The following analysis is informed by visits to villages in Rajsa-
mand and Bhilwara districts of Rajasthan, Badwani district of 
Madhya Pradesh and Chitrakoot district of Uttar Pradesh.
The fi rst important fi nding of meetings in the different dis-
tricts is that the introduction of demand-led schemes is often wel-
comed by the richer and more powerful people in the village that 
understand the benefi ts they can derive from such schemes. In 
fact, such schemes may often replace richer people’s dependence 
on their own private sources of water which in many cases are 
likely to cost more in the long run than a Swajaldhara scheme 
where the government subsidises 90% of the cost of the infra-
structure. Thus, in Galshyapa village of Chitrakoot, the people 
who could afford to pay the Swajaldhara contributions were keen 
on this scheme because existing wells in their village were about 
15 minutes away and the handpumps provided by the govern-
ment were largely non-functional. Yet, this bright picture was 
undermined. Indeed, there did not seem to be any dalits among 
the users. As a result of this non-participation in the scheme, the 
dalit inhabitants of this village who have been relying on the 
l ocal stream (in season) and on water obtained after digging the 
riverbed (throughout the period when the stream dries out) 
would carry on getting water in the same way as previously.
The demand-led approach is seen quite differently by poor 
people. The situation encountered in village after village pro-
vides the following general pattern. Whenever poor/marginal-
ised people currently have access to “a” source of water that satis-
fi es their most essential needs, they are satisfi ed with what they 
have, however bad the situation may be, especially in summer 
months. Even where individuals think that better access through 
a new scheme would be benefi cial, they often indicate that since 
they have not been able to pay the requested 10% contribution, 
they are thus not part of the benefi ciaries. Additionally, people 
often argue, especially in Rajasthan, that they believe water 
should be provided free by the government because it is such a 
basic necessity of life.
Swajaldhara projects thus raise questions of equity within vil-
lages since the professed willingness to pay that provides the 
conceptual justifi cation for demand-led schemes is, in fact, a 
function of wealth. As a result, the poorest people who most ur-
gently need better access to drinking water are the fi rst to be ex-
cluded from the list of benefi ciaries. In reform speak, the poor 
exclude themselves by not paying the 10% contribution but this is 
a fallacy which is debunked by the reality on the ground. If any-
thing, the ground reality indicates that people pay either when 
they can clearly afford it or when they are desperate enough to 
allocate more resources to water, necessarily at the expense of 
some other basic vital need such as food or health.
The issue of equity in access to water is not a new problem in 
rural areas. Indeed, caste equations have, for instance, played a 
major role in differential access to water for centuries. While in 
formal legal terms, caste-related inequalities have been banned, 
in practice, they still affect life in many places. Swajaldhara and 
the demand-led reforms do not affect caste equations directly. 
However, the problem is that they do not take into account the 
fact that caste discrimination is still prevalent in direct and indi-
rect ways. As a result, demand-led reforms have the potential to 
introduce wealth-based inequality in access to water which may 
reinforce existing inequalities. Two examples of these trends can 
be given. First, in the village of Bagatpura, Rajsamand district, 
the dominant Rajput people forced the dalit households to pay 
through threats even though the latter were economically too weak 
to afford the contribution. This went to the extent of a handpump 
being broken by upper caste people to force dalits living there to 
pay up the 10% contribution. Second, in both Maharashtra and 
Uttar Pradesh, where villages are big and made of different clus-
ters, the Swajaldhara scheme may never reach the dalit hamlet. 
This may or may not be a direct consequence of caste equations 
but the fact that Swajaldhara schemes may lead to such results as 
a result of a combination of long-standing c aste-related issues 
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together with the economically weaker p osition of dalits raises 
questions concerning the rationale of d emand-led reforms.
The issue of intra-village equity is deeply rooted in the philoso-
phy of the reforms which want to leave villages to manage their 
own water schemes. Given the prevailing condition in many parts 
of the country, it is impossible to expect that the wealthy, power-
ful and largely high caste members of the village will use the new 
concept of village ownership as a way to foster less unequal social 
relations within the village. Indeed, local politics may, in fact, 
dictate the contrary. Thus, in Sirola-Pithoda, Rajsamand district, 
people willing to pay the initial contribution were kept out of the 
scheme because they did not enjoy the favour of the powerful 
teacher who had initiated the scheme. Similarly, in Jogela-Miyala, 
Rajsamand district, a family that was willing to pay and whose 
house was close to the main supply pipe had been denied a con-
nection because they did not enjoy the favour of the sarpanch 
who was also the committee president. This is particularly prob-
lematic when drinking water is the subject matter. Thus, the gov-
ernment’s decision to progressively withdraw is likely to create, 
at least in the medium- and long-term, increased inequalities in 
access to water. 
With regard to the selection of specifi c schemes, the idea be-
hind demand-led schemes is that users choose the scheme that 
best suit their needs and fi nances. In what are by any measure 
very poor areas of the country such as Rajsamand and Bhilwara 
districts, one would thus expect the gram sabha to decide in 
f avour of the scheme that is the most cost-effective and delivers 
benefi ts to the greatest number of people in the village. It is thus 
surprising to fi nd that many villages opt for relatively expensive 
piped water schemes relying on a borewell (and its attendant 
electricity consumption) and a water tank to deliver benefi ts to 
private individual connections and community standposts. In-
deed, according to ministry fi gures, while the average contribu-
tion for an individual house connection is Rs 965 and Rs 810 for a 
community tap, it is only Rs 412 for a handpump.23 Despite this, 
the ministry recorded that there were only 3,186 benefi ciaries of 
handpumps and 5,451 for individual piped water connections. 
While there are a number of places in the country where the wa-
ter table is either falling fast or has already fallen so low that 
handpumps may not be a technically viable solution, the relative 
lack of popularity of handpumps under Swajaldhara cannot be 
explained only by technical factors. Indeed, in many parts of the 
country, including a very dry state like Rajasthan, it is the mil-
lions of handpumps installed by the government over the past 
few decades that actually provide access to water for crores of 
people on a daily basis. Their relevance has never been put in 
doubt. While schemes are effectively chosen by the users, they 
often rely on advice given by outsiders, such as non-governmen-
tal organisations (NGOs) working as support organisations, since 
they may not have the necessary technical expertise to evaluate 
all different options. It is possible that advice provided to com-
munities emphasise the benefi ts of individual house connections. 
Whether that is the case or not, the choice of schemes is clearly 
infl uenced by village water and sanitation committee (VWSC) 
membership. Indeed, fi eld observation reveals in village after 
v illage that, while the gram sabha is technically the body making 
the choice, in practice, the committee generally seems to be led 
by some of the more powerful and wealthier men in the village. 
This easily explains why so many villages would favour relatively 
expensive schemes because the decision is in effect taken by 
those “users” and not by the actual meeting of the whole village. 
Another surprising observation is that despite the fact that one of 
the “fundamental reform principles” of Swajaldhara is to pro-
mote conservation measures such as rainwater harvesting, none 
of the villages surveyed had either considered or implemented 
such structure.24 
Addressing Democratic Deficit
In institutional terms, the Swajaldhara Guidelines tried to remedy 
the rapidly apparent democratic defi cit arising from the setting 
up of VWSC besides the panchayati raj institutions proposed under 
the Swajal project. As a result, all VWSC were set up under the 
gram panchayat, which in deeply divided communities, is a pre-
condition for any attempt to foster social and gender equity in the 
schemes taken up. Yet, the basic philosophy of the panchayati raj 
constitutional scheme is not fully upheld. Indeed, in Uttar 
Pradesh, all VWSCs are in practice comprised seven members of 
the gram panchayat water committee and seven members co-
opted from among the users. These 14 people in effect constitute 
the committee that oversees drinking water projects, thus allow-
ing users a controlling say in the decisions of the committee. This 
is confi rmed by the fact that the ownership of public water 
schemes rests with the VWSCs.25
Panchayati raj institutions and their democratic nature also 
come under attack from a different angle with the original Swa-
jaldhara scheme. Assuming that the gram panchayat wanted to 
use its own funds to foster access to water, in the case of Uttar 
Pradesh, it was, in fact, prohibited from doing so. Indeed, pan-
chayats and the state government were specifi cally prohibited 
from using any government fund as a substitute for people’s con-
tribution.26 The intent of Swajaldhara to force individuals to pay 
whether they can afford or not is also clearly stated in the guide-
line’s specifi c admonition that elected members of Parliament 
(MPs) and members of the legislative assembly (MLAs) are prohib-
ited from using the funds at their disposal for development work 
in their constituency to pay the community contribution.27
The importance attached to cost recovery under Swajaldhara 
implies that the costs borne by users are an important element to 
be taken into account in analysing the scheme from a policy per-
spective. Two main elements can be distinguished, the contribu-
tion to capital costs and the contribution to maintenance and op-
eration costs. The limited contribution to capital costs was found 
in the ministry report quoted above not to exceed on average 
Rs 965 for a private connection. In the villages surveyed, the ac-
tual fi gures were much higher. They ranged from a low of Rs 600 
in Kansiya, Bhilwara to a high of Rs 7,000 Jogela-Miyala, Rajsa-
mand.28 These fi gures do not necessarily represent the actual 
cost paid by individuals to get a connection. People have to bear 
the cost of bringing pipes from the main line to their house and 
where the project design does not take the main line towards 
their house, their only option is to pay the full cost of their own 
connection from the main line. Another disturbing feature 
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o bserved in a number of villages was that the cost of becoming a 
“user” of the scheme shoots up for people who have not joined at 
the outset. The increase could be anything from 60% to nearly 
130%. This was usually explained by committee members as be-
ing an “interest” that newcomers should pay on the original sum. 
This is one of the ways in which leaving communities to arrange 
their own affairs leads to increasing inequalities in favour of a 
group of people who are most often already the wealthier and 
politically astute individuals in the village.
The contribution to operation and maintenance raises a differ-
ent set of issues. With regard to actual amounts paid, there are 
again signifi cant discrepancies. The report of the ministry fi nds 
an average Rs 37 paid for individual in-house connections per 
month.29 The village surveys indicate wide variations from Rs 36 
to Rs 150. Two important fi ndings emerge from these fi gures. 
First, variation seems to be explained mostly by the electricity 
cost associated with running the pump. The lack of transparency 
within villages makes it diffi cult to assess the causes of such dif-
ferences. They may be ascribed partly to the depth of the water 
table but are also likely to be infl uenced by the actual amount of 
water people take. Indeed, while people generally seemed to be 
reluctant to share water obtained through Swajaldhara schemes 
with their neighbours, and thus limit consumption to their indi-
vidual household needs, some people freely acknowledged using 
their Swajaldhara connection to water their gardens and in at 
least one village the individual in charge of the scheme had en-
sured that he could irrigate his own fi elds as an indirect benefi t of 
the scheme. Second, the costs paid by people for operation and 
maintenance never refl ected the long-term depreciation of the 
scheme. In other words, the monthly cost paid by individuals 
seems to generally refl ect the immediate electricity cost. This has 
immense implications where anything more than minor repairs 
need to be undertaken. Indeed, when asked the question directly, 
people are often quick to say that they would not be able to pay 
anything above the current fees. This is problematic because it 
indicates that the manner in which the schemes function does 
not ensure their long-term viability. The emphasis is clearly on 
ensuring that the schemes start to function, not on ensuring their 
long-term functioning. In the villages visited, which have been 
plagued by various types of access to water problems, this was 
nothing e xtraordinary. Queries concerning access to water, in 
case the scheme stopped functioning because the village could 
not afford repair costs, usually have people simply indicating that 
in such a situation they would go back to their previous sources of 
water. Besides the kind of pessimism that may be apparent in 
such res ponses, a bigger problem surfaces. Where the main 
sources of drinking water before Swajaldhara are handpumps or 
other i nfrastructure built by the government, “going back” to 
these sources seems an easy option today. In the future, when all 
operation and maintenance costs are imposed on villagers, such 
complacency will not be possible for anyone. In other words, 
when full cost recovery principles are implemented, villagers will 
be left with the choice of paying, whether they can afford or not, 
or not get access to water at all.
As indicated above, the introduction of the reforms is largely 
premised on the implementation of the constitutional mandate 
devolving powers to panchayats. While this is laudable in theory, 
practice indicates that a simple withdrawal of the government in 
favour of local actors is not progressive unless accountability at 
the local level is ensured and enforced by higher authorities. 
Where this is not the case, “decentralisation” is another word for 
increased concentration of power in the politically savvy and 
wealthier members of the local community. Two specifi c issues 
have come up in this regard in the surveys of Swajaldhara vil-
lages. First, in no village were accounts available. The usual ex-
cuse was that they had been sent to auditors. Second, in most 
villages people paid money but rarely got receipts. Even where 
receipts were obtained, they were never provided information as 
to the use of this money.
Subversion of Scheme 
The lack of external supervision is what allows the subversion of 
different aspects of the scheme by enterprising people. Thus, in 
some areas, contractors discovered in Swajaldhara a good busi-
ness opportunity. They can pay the 10% capital cost contribution 
on behalf of the community, and in return, get the government to 
pay 90% of their costs. Subsequently, they can run the scheme 
according to their own preferences. On paper, the community 
has paid and the scheme is operated at the local level. This satis-
fi es the basic principles of the reforms. In other villages, different 
ways to work around the scheme’s principles were found. In Ker 
Kheda, Bijoliyan block, Bhilwara district, the sarpanch and chair-
man of the Swajaldhara scheme had paid the whole community 
contribution himself and had probably been paying the electric-
ity bill as well. Two likely reasons explained this generosity. First, 
the whole village was dependent on his borewell – the only in the 
village – when other sources of water dried in the summer. The 
new scheme thus likely reduces his own direct costs of providing 
water in summer months. Second, water was identifi ed by villag-
ers interviewed as a major concern and everyone seemed ex-
tremely pleased with the new sources of water provided through 
this new scheme. This was likely going to strengthen his position 
politically in the village. This is not particularly surprising since 
similar outcomes were a lready reported a decade ago in the early 
attempts to impose cost recovery on villages.30
A last feature is the issue of disconnections. In principle, there 
is no link between demand-led schemes and disconnections. Yet, 
two disturbing features are apparent. In a situation where opera-
tion and maintenance is a monthly feature, the payment of the 
electricity bill is a precondition for actual access to water. Even 
where the amounts appear small, the users may not be able to 
pay. Thus, in Mukund Puriya, Bhilwara, despite making use of 
the pump only 30 minutes in the morning and 30 minutes in the 
evening, individual user’s share was about Rs 100 a month. Since 
most people could not pay this amount, the village ended up 
within about a year and a half after commissioning the scheme 
with an unpaid electricity bill of Rs 12,000 which led to their con-
nection being disconnected. This raises important questions with 
regard to disconnection of water supply. In a context where dis-
connections have been confi rmed as unacceptable even after full 
privatisation in the United Kingdom, there is little doubt that dis-
connection from water supply is a violation of the human right to 
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water. In the case of Indian villages, the additional diffi culty is 
that it is not water per se which is disconnected but the means of 
accessing it. Yet, in a country where an ever-increasing share of 
drinking water comes from groundwater and where the water 
table falls so fast in so many places that tubewells are a necessity 
in an increasing number of villages, disconnecting electricity 
amounts to stopping people from having access to water. It is thus 
imperative to look at water supply in a broader light and do 
e xactly the contrary of what some of the reforms urge us to do. 
Instead of disintegrating systems in separate units to make them 
all individually cost-effective, what is, in fact, required is to con-
sider systems in their broader context. Separating electricity con-
sumption from access to drinking water is thus a complete mis-
nomer in an increasing number of villages in India. 
3 Lessons from Ongoing Reforms
The evolution of Swajaldhara indicates that existing reform prin-
ciples are likely to evolve further in years to come. This is illus-
trated by the hesitation that characterised the fate of Swjaldhara 
under the Eleventh Plan. In the fi rst place, its discontinuation was 
suggested at the end of the Tenth Plan. This was meant to refor-
mulate the reform principles in view of perceived shortcomings, 
while maintaining the gist of the scheme. The idea was not to 
abandon the reforms but to repackage them and address some of 
the identifi ed problems such as diffi culties in collecting the com-
munity contribution.31 Following different suggestions on ways 
to move the reforms forward, it was eventually decided to carry 
on the experiment of allocating 20% of ARWSP funds for Swajald-
hara projects during the Eleventh Plan. This indicates that the 
time is not yet ripe for mainstreaming Swajaldhara to all ARWSP 
projects, but also shows a strong commitment to reforms, as 
i llustrated by the report of a meeting of state secretaries on rural 
drinking water stating that from 2008 onwards, “the Swajald-
hara scheme is going to be expedited drastically”.32
In a context where reforms will likely remain a central feature 
of drinking water supply policy for many years, it is very impor-
tant that they be closely analysed and debated. The need for the 
participation of elected representatives in the formulation of 
drinking water supply policies is necessary because they have not 
been consulted yet and because the reforms do not build on an 
existing drinking water legislation. The task at hand is thus e ither 
to bring the reforms to MPs and MLAs or to allow the legislature 
the space to develop a comprehensive drinking water legislation 
that is specifi cally geared towards meeting the needs of everyone 
in the country, with a priority on the rural poor.
The need to involve Parliament or legislative assemblies also 
stems from the fact that a number of water law reforms are 
c urrently ongoing and proposed. The fact that all these different 
laws can be drafted and adopted on such varied subjects as ground-
water, water user associations or institutional reforms clearly 
indicates that elected representatives can also address drinking 
water. What is surprising is that drinking water has not been the 
fi rst law reform introduced. This can nevertheless be explained by 
the fact that ongoing reforms do not emphasise as the fi rst priority 
the realisation of the human right to water for all but rather 
focus on improving management of water in d ifferent sectors.
As illustrated in this article, drinking water supply reforms 
have evolved over the past decade. Thus, after the experience of 
the Swajal project that was in part distrustful of panchayati raj 
institutions, a shift towards acknowledging the constitutionally 
sanctioned role of panchayats in this fi eld is noticeable. Yet, the 
fundamental premise of Swajal and Swajaldhara that emphasises 
individuals defi ned as “water users” over all other individuals in 
a given panchayat indicate that a lot more work needs to be done 
to ensure the full implementation of the constitutional frame-
work adopted in the 73rd constitutional amendment.
As indicated above, the government implemented for several 
decades drinking water supply policies that refl ected an under-
standing that it was under a duty to realise the human right to 
water for all rural residents of the country. In this context, ongo-
ing reforms are a study in contrast. Principles for reforms are, to 
a large extent, in direct opposition to the principles that guided 
governmental action for the previous several decades. This is of 
no concern in itself since evolving conditions often require policy 
changes to address evolving challenges. There is, however, an ad-
ditional issue that arises where a fundamental human right is 
concerned. While the government is at liberty to adopt different 
policies to realise its constitutional obligations, in the case of a 
fundamental right, it is the ultimate protector of human rights. 
This is not denied in ongoing reforms since even a draft memo-
randum of understanding between the union and the states for 
the Eleventh Plan states that there is a constitutional obligation to 
provide access to safe drinking water to the rural population.33 
This is in keeping with the case law, which recognises that the state 
has the responsibility to provide unpolluted drinking water.34
One of the central points of the now “old” policy framework is 
that the government acted under the perception, it was its duty to 
provide free water to its citizens. The government has also ac-
knowledged that unserved villages should be given priority over 
villages where supply is already provided as per the minimum 
norms in force.35 This refl ects its concern to ensure the realisa-
tion of the minimum core content of the human right to water for 
all before providing enhanced coverage to people already pro-
vided with water. In other words, the government has attempted 
to progressively realise the right to water as per the stipulations 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) that imposes on member countries to take meas-
ures that contribute to the realisation of the rights over time. 
In the context of the present reforms, one of the most sensitive 
points related to the ICESCR is that it specifi cally prohibits the in-
troduction of measures that would curtail any gains made towards 
the full realisation of a human right. The new policy principles 
conceive water as an economic good, contemplate imposing on 
each individual community an increasingly important burden of 
their own water supply, and generally, conceive of a reduced role 
for the government and a concomitant increase of the role of the 
private sector in delivering drinking water. The implementation of 
these new policies will lead to outcomes that are at least in some 
cases unacceptable from the point of view of established measures 
of equity and will directly or indirectly lead to violations of the hu-
man right to water. While the demand-led paradigm benefi ts a 
segment of the rural population, it affects the poorest by bypassing 
SPECIAL ARTICLE
December 12, 2009 vol xliv no 50 EPW  Economic & Political Weekly54
them, it creates increased inequalities in access to water, and in 
the long run, the imposition of o peration and maintenance costs 
to each village individually will lead to reduced access to water in 
villages less well-endowed with water. 
Such policies need to be reversed because water is far too fun-
damental for human life. The imposition of operation and main-
tenance costs on rural communities does not seem to be based on 
rational justifi cations. As indicated in documents for the Eleventh 
Plan, one of the major policy concerns is that high operation and 
maintenance costs lead to the closure of water supply schemes 
because the government is not in a position to maintain and mon-
itor assets. It is estimated that only 20% of the required funds for 
operation and maintenance are available at present.36 In a situa-
tion where the government is unable to muster the necessary re-
sources for operation and maintenance, it is highly unlikely that 
rural communities will be able to take on the job and do better 
than the government.37 If at all they do better than the govern-
ment, it will be out of desperation because nobody can survive 
without water. The implication will be that other vital needs will 
suffer since this will likely imply a transfer of resources within 
already tight budgets.
On the whole, ongoing reforms need to be thought afresh be-
cause they do not primarily ensure a better realisation of the hu-
man right to water for the poorest people with least access to wa-
ter, and only partially, implement the constitutional framework 
for decentralised democratic governance. Additionally, the re-
placement of social equity as a premise for drinking water supply 
policy with economic effi ciency neither ensures that the poorest 
and socially most disadvantaged individuals in a given village 
are preferentially targeted nor that the regions of any individual 
state that need special attention for hydrological or social reasons 
are preferentially targeted. Whereas the “old” framework has 
been in need of changes to ensure better delivery of what the 
government seeks to achieve, ongoing reforms do not appear to 
be the answer that will effectively address the needs of the poor-
est and most marginalised.
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